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We build a tractable stylized model of external sovereign debt and endogenous international 
interest rates. In corrupt economies with rent-seeking groups stealing public resources, a 
politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by permanent fiscal impatience which leads to 
excessive issuing of sovereign bonds. External creditors envision the corrupt economy’s fiscal 
impatience and buy its bonds at higher interest rates. In turn, this interest-rate increase 
exacerbates the problem of oversupplying debt, leading the economy to a perfect-foresight 
trap. In incorrupt countries which have entered a high-interest-rate/high debt-GDP-ratio trap 
because an immediately recent disaster has caused a sudden jump to a high outstanding debt-
GDP ratio, we show that bailout plans with controlled interest rates can help in reducing debt-
GDP ratios after some time. On the contrary, under corruption, we show that bailouts are 
ineffective unless rent-seeking groups are eradicated. 
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The recent sovereign-debt crisis in the Euro zone has led to sovereign bailouts.1 One reason
behind these bailouts is the fact shown in Figure 1: external-debt-GDP ratios in the Euro
area are very high￿ in fact, among the highest in the world￿ and have increased substantially
following the 2008 ￿nancial crisis, thereby triggering fears of default.2 Another reason for
bailouts is the fear of contagion that can be triggered by a sovereign default in the EU
through the highly integrated European banking system.3 A key initiating force that triggers
sovereign default pressure and default fears, is a high country-speci￿c interest rate set in
international markets.4 A country that borrows at high interest rates makes the servicing
burden of new debt socially unsustainable as it implies higher taxes and/or lower public
consumption, reducing welfare. Thus, the stated rationale behind bailouts is the need to
make the servicing costs of debt socially and politically bearable. So, bailout plans in the
EU have focused on regulating such high interest rates in order to o⁄set the negative impact
of the latter on future policies of bailed-out countries. The interplay between international
interest rates and the political economy of external-debt issuing is not well understood,
1 For a description of the EU bailout for Greece and further information regarding legal constraints for
bailouts in the EU, see Buiter and Rahbari (2010), which is downloadable from:
http://www.nber.org/~wbuiter/Greece.pdf
2 A glance at Figure 1 reveals that governments in the Euro area tend to issue external sovereign debt which
is, (i) a substantial fraction of GDP, and (ii) increasing in the past few recent years. To one extent, this
trend is due to a rapid globalization of capital markets in the past two decades. Yet, since the Euro zone is
an almost perfectly integrated banking and capital-markets system, it is perhaps unsurprising that several
countries within the Euro zone have the highest external-debt-GDP ratios appearing in Figure 1.
3 Euro area commercial banks typically hold a diversi￿ed portfolio of government bonds of several union
countries and thus can be severely a⁄ected by a default through losses on these bonds. Bolton and Jeanne
(2011) provide information on Euro area commercial banks foreign debt exposures as of 2010. Bolton and
Jeanne (2011) develop a sovereign debt model that highlights the link from sovereign to banking crisis. The
link is facilitated by the the fact that government bonds serve as collateral for interbank loans and thus
provide a funding source for investment and output. Acharya et. al (2011) argue and provide evidence that
a crucial factor behind the rise in sovereign risk was the recent ￿nancial sector bailouts.
4 Indeed, Kohlscheen (2010) reports that the likelihood of external-debt defaults is higher than this for
domestic-debt defaults. Since the debt-servicing burden is a key factor for both types of defaults, one of the
direct sources of pressure for default is the high-level of interest rates formed in international markets.
3causing vivid debates about bailout-plan designing.5 Our purpose here is to ￿ll this gap.
We build a stylized model which emphasizes the political economy of external-sovereign-
debt issuing and its interaction with international capital markets. Through this model
we contribute to the debate on the e⁄ectiveness of bailout plans by making a distinction.
We distinguish the permanent and structural nature of sovereign-debt traps in countries
which su⁄er from corruption, from the terminable nature of sovereign-debt traps in incorrupt
countries.
We demonstrate that, when rent-seeking groups are capable of consuming public re-
sources, the politicoeconomic outcome exhibits permanent ￿scal impatience: more resources
are spent today and taxes are postponed for later. As a consequence, the rate at which the
corrupt economy issues external sovereign debt is higher than the rate dictated by the rate of
time preference of external creditors. Within a monetary union, this impatience discrepancy
leads to higher country-speci￿c real interest rates for the corrupt country. With higher cost
of borrowing, excessive sovereign-debt issuing is exacerbated, leading the corrupt country to
an excessively high sovereign-debt-GDP ratio which may be socially unsustainable.
The number of noncooperative rent-seeking groups plays a crucial role. More than one
rent-seeking groups lead to higher ￿scal impatience, due to a commons problem which aggra-
vates the voracity e⁄ect on public resources.6 For example, if rent seeking is tightly attached
to a polarized multi-partisan system, the impact of corruption on excessive sovereign debt
issuing is stronger. If all rent-seeking groups cooperate in order to formulate a single ￿big
mob￿ , then the ￿scal impatience problem may be avoided. However, even under one ￿mob￿ ,
and even without the ￿scal impatience problem, a high outstanding debt-GDP ratio gener-
5 Debates are not unjusti￿able, since advanced economies in the EU have been, until recently, perceived as
being insulated from sovereign default risk. As Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2008) report, the latest incidence of
sovereign default in Europe is Austria in 1940, Germany in 1939, Poland in 1940 and Hungary in 1941.
6 For an introduction to the ￿voracity e⁄ect￿caused by the presence of rent-seeking groups see, for example,
Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999).
4ates higher utility losses for non-rent-seekers due to a higher discrepancy between taxes paid
and public bene￿ts enjoyed. So, even with a single rent-seeking group in action, corruption
is a source of social dissatisfaction and fragility in cases of emergency debt-issuing due to
disasters. Since our analysis is performed under perfect foresight, our model serves as a tool
for demonstrating that corruption is a structural problem in a monetary union, needing to
be treated as such a type of problem.
In incorrupt countries (with no rent-seeking groups), optimal ￿scal policy is aligned with
the rate of time preference of external creditors. This alignment implies no structural ￿scal-
policy pathologies. Yet, even without structural problems, if the outstanding debt-GDP
ratio is exceptionally high, fragility may still arise. If external creditors think that the
social-pressure burden of servicing a certain outstanding debt-GDP ratio is excessive, then
they may expect a unilateral haircut as a means for alleviating this burden. On the one
hand, it is such an anticipation of a haircut that leads to an increase in interest rates, in
order to compensate investors. On the other hand, high interest rates make equilibrium
debt-GDP ratios to increase even further, leading the economy to a trap.
Two key ingredients may trigger such a trap. First, it is a high debt-GDP ratio. One
reason for inheriting a high initial outstanding debt-GDP ratio may be that a disaster oc-
curred in the immediately recent past, requiring substantially high emergency public spend-
ing/borrowing. Second, a critical informational asymmetry between external creditors and
a country￿ s government may arise after a disaster, leading to a miscoordination.7 Our model
is deterministic, so we do not model explicitly information and we do not explain how a
7 A recent study showing that expectations after a disaster can be over-reactive is Koulovatianos and Wieland
(2011). In a model of rational learning about rare disasters, Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011) show that
after a disaster occurs beliefs jump to pessimistic levels, and that they slowly recover to optimism after some
time that disasters do not occur. In such a framework of learning, slight informational asymmetries at times
of optimism can led to major di⁄erences in optimism pessimism after a disaster occurs and after beliefs jump
to new levels. If beliefs of others are unknown, the possibility of market failures is open.
5country enters such a trap. Nevertheless, we describe the mechanics of such a trap: our
model implies that even under optimal policy, high interest rates make debt-GDP ratios to
increase over time, leading to ￿scal divergence within the monetary union, and calling for
some bailout plan.
Given the trap scenario described above, we study the success potential of an EU-type
bailout. We focus on the level of interest rates that bailout plans may o⁄er. For coun-
tries outside the trap, the key determinant of free-market international interest rates is the
rate of time preference.8 We call these outside-trap free-market interest rates, ￿normal￿ .
For countries inside a trap scenario, our model identi￿es a crucial threshold level of ini-
tial external-debt-GDP ratios: below this threshold, a short-duration bailout plan can o⁄er
above-￿normal￿interest rates and still be successful; above this threshold, a bailout plan
must o⁄er lower than ￿normal￿interest rates, which implies a transfer of resources from
the monetary union to the indebted country. By ￿success￿of a bailout plan we mean that
the external-debt-GDP ratio is reduced to a socially sustainable level after a period of time,
which allows the domestic economy to return to free international bond markets.
In the case of corruption with more than one rent-seeking groups, the structural nature of
￿scal impatience does not allow a government to be in international markets for a long period
of time. Even if a bailout plan with lower than ￿normal￿interest rates is implemented, and
even if the corrupt country￿ s debt-GDP ratio falls to low levels, if left alone in free markets
for some time, excessive debt-GDP ratios will return. A bailout plan in the case of corruption
should aim at eliminating rent-seeking groups.
Our model is stylized. We assume away physical capital and uncertainty. Although it
seems unnatural to study bailouts in a deterministic environment, our framework rules out
8 In our model we assume that the rate of time preference is the same between domestic taxpayers and
external creditors.
6known technical complexities. These technical complexities relate to optimal debt-maturity
setting, state contingency, and other issues related to the arbitrage of risky assets.9 In turn,
we are able to analyze the commons problem arising from the Markovian-Nash strategic
behavior of rent-seeking groups while international interest rates are endogenous.10
Another simplifying assumption we adopt is exogenous productivity growth. Although
a substantial body of literature studies a potential two-way causality between external sov-
ereign debt and growth, our model focuses on the impact of exogenous growth rates on
the dynamics of sovereign debt and on international-market interest rates of government
bonds.11
A few recent papers explicitly explore various policy responses to sovereign default con-
cerns in a monetary union. Daniel and Shiamptanis (2010) argue that the recent EU debt
crisis primarily re￿ ects a potential ￿scal solvency crisis where the present value of ￿scal
surpluses are inconsistent with a sustainable long run debt trajectory. In their analysis, par-
tial sovereign default arises as a policy response in order to restore ￿scal solvency￿ though
this response is ine⁄ective without ￿scal reforms that raise ￿scal surpluses. Roch and Uhlig
9 There is a substantial body of literature studying sovereign debt and risk of default, which makes simplifying
assumptions in order to cope with these complexities. Most of these studies have built on the model of Eaton
and Gerzowitz (1981) with a debt maturity of one period and ￿nancial autarky as a default penalty. Using
this framework several papers try to explain the factors involved in government default, particularly the
role of interest rates and output ￿ uctuations. These papers include Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano
(2008) and Guimaraes (2011). Two key studies explaining optimal maturity structure in economies without
capital are Stokey and Lucas (1983) and Angeletos (2002).
10A recent study focusing on the impact of rent-seeking politics and ￿scal debt is Caballero and Yared
(2010). In their model, rent-seeking governments alternate exogenously (randomly), and they borrow at
a ￿xed international interest rate, following the example of other papers which use this ￿xed-interest-rte
assumption. For example, Cuadra et.al (2010) analyze ￿scal policy in the presence of sovereign default risk
in emerging economies in a dynamic stochastic small open economy with constant interest rates. Other
recent work studying ￿scal policy in the presence of external debt under constant ￿world￿interest rates, is
one by Aguiar et. al (2009), who investigate optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt
policy without commitment where governments are more impatient than the private sector. Finally, another
literature strand focuses on political instability and sovereign default in emerging countries. Examples are
Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Alesina and Tabellini (1988).
11External sovereign debt and its e⁄ects on growth have been studied by Cohen and Sachs (1986). A key
empirical study on the interplay between external and growth is Reinhart and Roggo⁄(2010), while Reinhart
and Roggo⁄ (2008) contributes an impressive set of historical data set of sovereign default crises.
7(2011) show that the existing EU bailout plans cannot be successful without strong ￿scal
retrenchment￿ their ultimate e⁄ect is simply to postpone default. The reason for this inef-
fectiveness is two-fold: the bailout allows governments to keep borrowing to ￿nance public
consumption and is o⁄ered at a relatively steep price (compared to the risk-free rate).
In Section 2 we describe the benchmark model of optimal ￿scal policy. We add rent-
seeking groups to this benchmark in Section 3. In Section 4 we study sovereign bailouts
emphasizing the role of interest rates, and we comment on bailouts and corruption, o⁄er-
ing some comments on the bailout of Ireland, Greece, Portugal and on the sovereign-debt
prospects of Spain and Italy. We make some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Benchmark model of optimal ￿scal policy
2.1 The domestic economy
2.1.1 Competitive equilibrium
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical in￿nitely-lived agents of total
mass equal to 1. A single composite consumable good is produced under perfect competition,
using only labor as input through the linear technology,
yt = zt ￿ lt , (1)
in which y is units of output, l is labor hours, and z is productivity. Assume that productivity
at time 0 is equal to 1 (z0 = 1), and that it grows exogenously at rate ￿, i.e.,
zt = (1 + ￿)
t . (2)
Assume no uncertainty, and assume that the representative agent draws utility from pri-
vate consumption (c), leisure (1 ￿ l), and also from the consumption of a public good, G,




t [ln(ct) + ￿l ln(1 ￿ lt) + ￿G ln(Gt)] (3)
in which ￿ 2 (0;1) is the utility discount factor, while ￿l;￿G > 0 capture the weight on leisure
and public consumption in the utility function respectively. The public good is ￿nanced via
both income taxes and ￿scal debt,
Gt = Bt+1 ￿ (1 + rt)Bt + ￿tYt , (4)
in which Bt is ￿scal debt in period t￿ assuming the government issues only one period zero
coupon bonds, rt is the interest rate for servicing the debt in period t, Yt is aggregate
production in period t, and ￿t is the income tax rate in period t. We assume all ￿scal debt
is external in period 0, i.e., that agents in this economy do not hold any government bonds.
For simplicity, we also assume that agents cannot have access to domestic government bonds
in the future, and that the consumable good is not storable, that there is no other form of
capital. Under these assumptions, the budget constraint of an individual household is
ct = (1 ￿ ￿t)ztlt . (5)
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility given by (3), subject to equa-
tion (5), by picking the optimal stream of consumption and labor supply throughout the
in￿nite horizon, (f(ct;lt)g
1
t=0), for a given stream of tax rates and provided public-good quan-
tities, f(Gt;￿t)g
1
t=0. Since the solution to this problem is based on intra-temporal conditions




= L , t = 0;1;::: , (6)
and notice that market clearing implies that aggregate labor supply is equal to L as well.
The reason why labor supply does not respond to changes in marginal tax rates is that
9logarithmic utility makes the income and substitution e⁄ects of taxation on leisure cancel
out each other. Combining L with (1) and (2) gives the competitive-equilibrium GDP level,
Yt = (1 + ￿)
tL . (7)
2.1.2 Policy setting
The government chooses the optimal sequence of taxes and debt (f(￿t;Bt+1)g1
t=0) in order to
maximize the lifetime utility of the representative household (or a utilitarian social welfare
since everyone is the same in this economy), subject to the ￿scal-budget constraint given by
(4), and for a given sequence of interest rates, frtg
1
t=0, determined in international markets.
Substituting the competitive-equilibrium solution given by equations (6) and (7) into (3),











ln(1 ￿ ￿t) + ￿G ln
￿




in which ￿V is a constant that does not a⁄ect optimization regarding the determination of
the optimal sequence f(￿t;Bt+1)g1
t=0. In Appendix A we show that ￿rst-order conditions
@V=@￿t = 0 and @V=@Bt+1 = 0, lead to the price-dependent (frtg
1
t=0) solutions,
Gt = ￿G (1 ￿ ￿t)Yt , (9)


























, for all t ￿ 2 , (11)
10in which
￿(￿0) ￿ (1 + ￿G)(1 ￿ ￿0)L .
Equations (11) and (10) are only the general solution to the system of optimality condi-
tions (shown in Appendix A), since the coe¢ cient ￿(￿0) is still undetermined. By specifying
the level of ￿0, the level of government in period 0 and the level of outstanding ￿scal debt
in period 1 (B1) are fully determined (see equations (9) and (10)). In the following section
we analyze how the government speci￿es ￿0 for a given stream of interest rates.
2.1.3 Fiscal solvency considerations and optimal government size
Given a fully pre-speci￿ed stream of future interest rates, frtg
1
t=0, the government must make
sure that ￿0 is not too low, so that it can avoid ￿scal insolvency. In addition, as implied
by equation (9), the government must ensure that the current tax rate is not too high, so
as to avoid entering a socially undesirable suboptimal path of under-providing the public
good in which ￿scal resources saved by low interest rates are wasted. Such considerations







= 0 . (12)
Combining the transversality condition given by equation (12) with equation (11) determines
coe¢ cient ￿(￿0), namely,
￿(￿0) = (1 ￿ ￿)[W1 ￿ (1 + r0)B0] , (13)
in which W1 is the present value of all future GDP levels, conditional on a given interest-rate
stream frtg
1





















After combining equations (9) and (13) we derive the optimal government size of ￿scal








































Equation (16) is intuitive. The term rtBt=Yt shows how the current cost of servicing the debt
decreases Gt=Yt. The term Bt=Yt reveals that future taxes must pay back the outstanding
sovereign debt-GDP ratio, which also contributes to reducing Gt=Yt in the current period.
Finally, the term ztWt+1=Yt contains all future interest rates, frsg
1
s=t+1. Equation (15))
reveals that higher future interest rates reduce current economy￿ s worth (ztWt+1=Yt) through
increasing the future interest burden for servicing sovereign debt, decreasing Gt=Yt as well.
It remains to determine the level of interest rates in any future period. In order to do
so, we model external creditors in a way that continues to o⁄er analytical tractability to
international-equilibrium setting, and to further applications. The next two sections present
the external-creditors model and interest-rate determination.




















122.2 The external creditors
We denote all external-creditor variables using a star. For simplicity, assume that external








subject to the budget constraint,
B
￿





Notice that the rate of time preference, (1 ￿ ￿)=￿, in the utility function of creditors, (17),
is equal to the rate of time preference of domestic households.
The solution to the problem of maximizing (17) subject to (18) is,
c
￿










1 = ￿ (1 + r0)B
￿
0 . (19)
Equation (19) determines the demand for bonds by external creditors in period 1. Loga-
rithmic preferences are responsible for this compact algebraic solution given by (19), which
implies that demand for external debt in period 1 depends only on the return of bonds in
period 0. In the following section we combine (19) with domestic supply of bonds in order
to determine interest rates.
2.3 Determining interest-rate levels
Interest-rate levels are determined by equalizing demand and supply of government bonds.
In particular, demand for bonds one period ahead, B￿
1, is given by equation (19). Supply
13of bonds is given by combining the optimal level of government spending with the ￿scal-
budget constraint. To determine supply of bonds in period 0 we combine equation (10) with
equation (13) to obtain,
B1 = ￿ (1 + r0)B0 + (1 ￿ ￿)W1 ￿ L . (20)
After applying the equilibrium condition B1 = B￿












, t = 0;1;::: . (22)







Wt+2 + L , t = 0;1;::: . (23)





￿ 1 , t = 0;1;::: , (24)
in which the symbol ￿rss￿denotes a steady-state level of international interest rates. As we
show in the next section, since ￿ (1 + rss)=(1 + ￿) = 1, having rt = rss for all t 2 f0;1;:::g,
implies a balanced-growth steady state in the domestic economy, characterized by a constant
tax rate, debt-GDP ratio, and public-consumption-GDP ratio throughout the whole horizon.
Equation (24) determines the entire sequence of interest rates except for this in period
0, which is indeterminate. By substituting equation (22) into (16), the optimal government


















142.3.1 Debt-GDP-ratio dynamics in the benchmark model
As explained in the previous section, international capital-markets equilibrium in our bench-
mark model implies that the interest in period 0, r0, is indeterminate, while rt = rss for all
t 2 f1;2;:::g. So, let the interest rate r0 take any value r0 > ￿1. For notational simplicity,







, t = 0;1;::: .
After combining equations (20) and (21),
b1 =
￿ (1 + r0)
1 + ￿
b0 . (26)
Considering the generalization of the ￿scal budget constraint in domestic equilibrium, given
by equation (20) for t 2 f1;2;:::g, i.e. Bt+1 = ￿ (1 + rt)Bt + (1 ￿ ￿)ztWt+1 ￿ Yt, and
substituting the international-equilibrium interest rates, rt = rss for all t 2 f1;2;:::g, we
obtain,
bt = b1 , t = 1;2;::: . (27)
Equations (26) and (27) imply that the debt-GDP ratio stays at the same level from period 1
and on, while its level in period 1 depends on r0. In Appendix A we show that one optimality
condition is ￿t = 1 ￿ [￿=(1 + ￿)]
t ￿t
j=1 (1 + rj) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0), which implies that, since rt = rss
for all t 2 f1;2;:::g,
￿t = ￿0 , t = 0;1;::: , (28)
no matter if r0 6= rss or not. In addition, (9) and (28) imply that
gt = g0 , t = 0;1;::: , (29)
for any r0 as well, no matter if r0 6= rss or not. So, equations (28) and (29) imply that,
in international equilibrium, there is a smoothing of taxes and public-consumption-GDP
15ratios. Yet, as r0 increases, equation (25) implies that g0 goes down, and, as a consequence,
equation (9) implies that ￿0 increases. Finally, equation (26) shows that an increase in
r0 causes b1 to increase as well, which adds to the debt burden of the domestic economy
and enhances the need for a permanent increase in tax rates and for a permanent drop in
public-consumption-GDP ratios.
A remarkable benchmark is to set,
r0 = r
ss . (30)
Under (30), equation (26) implies that,
bt = b0 , t = 0;1;::: , (31)














The benchmark given by (31) determines the level of current international interest rates
(with r0 being given by (30)) which guarantees that the domestic country￿ s debt-to-GDP
ratio remains constant throughout the in￿nite horizon.
3. Corruption: rent-seeking groups, the voracity e⁄ect and exter-
nal sovereign debt
Here we extend our setup by including rent-seeking groups which have in￿ uence on ￿scal-
budget setting and manage to consume resources for themselves. We focus on deriving the
Markov-Nash equilibrium of our setup with rent-seeking groups and we study the long-run
impact of these groups on ￿scal policy. We demonstrate that the ability of rent-seeking
groups to consume resources leads to a form of a ￿voracity e⁄ect￿on public spending which
16implies higher tax rates, lower public-good levels available to society, and excess sovereign-
debt issuing in the long run.13
3.1 Model with rent-seeking groups
We begin with the model developed in Section 2 and introduce N rent-seeking groups in
the domestic economy, which have the power to expropriate resources through paying lower
taxes. In each period t 2 f0;1;:::g, a rent-seeking group j 2 f1;:::;Ng manages to extract
a total rent of size CR
j;t. Let the population mass of each rent-seeking group be ￿j with
PN
j=1 ￿j < 1, and let all households participating in a rent-seeking group j be identical
within the group for all j 2 f1;:::;Ng, and having equal shares of private individual rents,
cR
j;t. So, the total rent expropriated by group j in the form of private consumption is,
C
R
j;t = ￿j ￿ c
R
j;t , (33)
and this rent is distributed equally among the rent-seeking group￿ s individual members in
the form of tax bene￿ts. So, the government￿ s ￿scal-budget constraint is,





j;t ￿ ￿tYt , (34)
For simplicity we assume that participation in a rent-seeking group is exogenous and costless
(e.g., inherited participation). Yet, we assume that private consumption of a rent-seeking
individual household, ct, and the rent cR
j;t are considered to be separate goods. The reason
behind this distinction is that individual rents of a member of group j 2 f1;:::;Ng, cR
j;t,
appear in the form of private bene￿ts that di⁄er from the typical consumer basket. Yet, we
assume that the price per unit of cR
j;t is equal to the cost of the consumer basket a-priori, for
all j 2 f1;:::;Ng and for all t 2 f0;1;:::g.
13The term ￿voracity e⁄ect￿has been introduced by Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999).
Tornell and Lane (1999) have argued that, when some economies lack strong legal political institutions, they
may experience a more than proportional redistribution of ￿scal resources after a positive shock to their
income, decreasing growth. Their mechanism relies upon rent-seeking groups stealing public resources.
17An individual rent-seeker who is a member of j 2 f1;:::;Ng does not control the level
of consumption cR
j;t that she obtains from the group through any form of private e⁄ort or












with !j > 0, and her economic problem is maximizing (35) subject to the budget constraint
cj;t = (1 ￿ ￿t)ztlj;t . (36)
The problem of any non-rent-seeker is this of maximizing (3) subject to (5), exactly as in
the benchmark model of Section 2. Optimal choices are given by,
lj;t = lt =
￿l
1 + ￿l
= L , t = 0;1;::: , (37)
while
cj;t = ct = (1 ￿ ￿t)ztL . (38)
Since labor supply is identical across rent seekers and non rent seekers, Yt = zt ￿ L, as it has
also been in the benchmark model presented in Section 2.
3.2 In￿ uence of rent-seeking groups in politics: symmetric Markov-
Nash equilibrium
In the benchmark model, the idea of maximizing social welfare in an economy with identical
households re￿ ects the need of political support for any proposed policies. In the presence
of rent-seeking groups, policy is set through rent-seeking groups. In particular, rent-seeking
groups compete noncooperatively with other groups for rents, while ensuring that they have
the support of the broader public. In order to gain the support of the broader public,
14This is a simpli￿cation: we assume that even if rent-seeking groups have to lobby, this is a costless collective
action: it requires no individual e⁄ort or any other sacri￿ce.
18each rent-seeking group j 2 f1;:::;Ng maximizes a convex combination of, (i) the sum of
individual utilities of non-rent seekers and, (ii) the group￿ s utility derived by the stream of



















































j;t + ￿tYt , (40)
and
Yt = ztL = (1 + ￿)
tL , (41)
in which ￿Vj is a constant which does not a⁄ect optimization, the term, ln(1 ￿ ￿t)+￿G ln(Gt),
is the policy-dependent variable component of non-rent-seeker momentary indirect utility,




i6=j is the Markov-Nash strategies of type CR
i;t = Ci;R (Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t) by all other
rent-seeking groups. We also assume symmetry in political in￿ uence and size of groups,
namely:
￿R;j = ￿R and ￿j = ￿ for all j 2 f1;:::;Ng . (42)
De￿nition 1 gives the concept of domestic political equilibrium with rent-seeking groups that
we employ.
De￿nition 1 Given a stream of interest rates, frtg
1
t=0, a Markov-Perfect Nash
Political Equilibrium (MPNPE) is a set of strategies,
￿
Ci;R￿N
i=1 of the form CR
i;t =
19Ci;R (Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t) and a set of policy decision rules fT;Bg of the form ￿t =
T(Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t) and Bt+1 = B(Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t), such that each and every rent




Markov-perfect games can be expressed in a recursive format through the use of Bellman
equations.15 Proposition 1 provides a MPNPE in linear strategies.
Proposition 1 Given a stream of interest rates, frtg
1
t=0, there is a symmetric
MPNPE equilibrium given by,
C
i;R (Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t) = C
R (Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t) = ￿R ￿ [ztWt+1 ￿ (1 + rt)Bt]
(43)
for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng, in which Wt+1 is given by (14).
￿R =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿R
1 + ￿G + ￿R + (N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)￿R
, (44)
and also
Bt+1 = B(Bt;zt j frsg
1
s=t) = ￿N (1 + rt)Bt + (1 ￿ ￿N)ztWt+1 ￿ Yt , (45)
in which
￿N =
1 + ￿G + ￿R
1 + ￿G + ￿R + (N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)￿R
￿ , (46)
while
￿t = T(Bt;zt j frsg
1































. In the Proof of Proposition 1, which appears in Appendix B, we
use Lagrangians and not Bellman equations.
20Proof See Appendix B. ￿
In the following section we use the results of Proposition 1 in order to examine the
possibility of sovereign traps by paying special attention to the formation of international
interest rates.
3.3 Determination of international interest rates and the possibil-
ity of sovereign traps
The key insight o⁄ered by Proposition 1 is the introduction of a new discount factor, ￿N,
which is related to ￿ through equation (46). Equation (46) reveals that if N ￿ 2, then
￿N < ￿, i.e. the domestic economy becomes collectively more impatient due to the strategic
voracity e⁄ect of interest groups. Since ￿ is the discount factor of external creditors, this
voracity e⁄ect on collective patience re￿ ected on ￿N creates a tendency to oversupply bonds
compared to the case of N = 1, or compared to the case of no corruption. The following
section distinguishes the case of N = 1 from this of N ￿ 2, and demonstrates that the
voracity e⁄ect on bond supply leads to high interest rates and explosive debt-GDP ratios.
3.3.1 One big ￿mob￿
In the case of N = 1, the discount factor ￿N = ￿. Equating external-creditor demand for
bonds, which is given by (19), with domestic supply of bonds, given by (45) with ￿N replaced
by ￿, leads to equation (22) and consequently to (24), i.e. rt+1 = rss for all t 2 f0;1;:::g.
Setting also r0 = rss gives equation (31) of Section 2, namely that, bt = b0 for all t 2 f0;1;:::g.
Yet, unlike equation (32) in Section 2, equations (48) and (47) imply
g0 =
￿G











21while gt = g0 and ￿t = ￿0 for all for all t 2 f0;1;:::g. Equation (49) implies that, in the
presence of one rent-seeking group, steady-state public consumption as a share of GDP is
lower compared to this of the benchmark model of Section 2. According to (49), the steady
state tax rate is also higher.
3.3.2 More than one noncooperative rent-seeking groups
The case with N ￿ 2 rent-seeking groups is more complicated. Proposition 2 summarizes
the dynamics of interest rates.
Proposition 2 If N ￿ 2, then
bt+1 =
￿ (1 + rt)
1 + ￿
bt , for all t 2 f0;1;:::g , (50)
rt > r







(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)
=
￿











, for all t 2 f1;2;:::g , (53)
while (b0;r0) satisfy,







Proof See Appendix B. ￿
In order to calculate the interest rates in this case, we can apply backward induction using
equations (53) and (50). One way is to start with bt = bss, and then to use bt￿1 = bss ￿" for
22some " > 0 arbitrarily small, and substituting this value for bt￿1 in equation (53). Then, we
can continue backwards using (53) and (50).16
The key message given by Proposition 2 is that if the domestic economy remains in
free markets forever, then the rent-seeking groups increase the debt-GDP perpetually. The
limiting level of the debt-GDP ratio corresponds to exhausting the domestic economy￿ s total
wealth-to-GDP ratio, when the latter is evaluated at the asymptotic level of interest rates,
rss, i.e. bt ! 1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)]. This result holds for all initial debt-GDP levels b0 with
b0 < 1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)].
A commons problem which arises through rent-seeking in politics is the key source leading
to our results. With more than one non-cooperating rent-seeking groups, there is over-
exploitation of public resources. This over-exploitation tendency leads to a form of collective
impatience, which is re￿ ected in the domestic government￿ s discount factor ￿N. With ￿N < ￿
whenever N ￿ 2, the free-capital-markets outcome under prefect foresight is an in￿nitely-
long stream of high interest rates (rt > rss for all t 2 f1;2;:::g). These high interest rates
lead to a perpetual increase in the debt-GDP ratio. We return to these dynamics in our
discussion of sovereign bailouts in Section 4.
4. Debt-GDP thresholds and sovereign bailouts
Our framework is capable of isolating how the recent international-market pressures on the
cost of ￿nancing the newly issued sovereign debt a⁄ect optimal sovereign debt policy. These
international interest-rate pressures have been particularly strong for the newly issued debt
of Greece, Ireland, and other countries of the EU periphery such as Portugal and Spain
(bond spreads in relation to equilibrium interest rates of German government bonds), after
the recent ￿nancial crisis of 2008.
16In the proof of Proposition 2, we provide an explicit solution to this backward induction procedure.
23Although a formal theory that explains bond spreads would require the explicit mod-
eling of default risk, default expectations, and speculator informational asymmetries, such
an analysis is beyond the scope of our study.17 Here, we are interested in delivering a sim-
ple framework that enables us to evaluate bailout plans through paper-and-pencil methods.
The focus of our analysis is to emphasize the ￿scal pressure caused by the level of interna-
tionally formed interest rates. To this end, a deterministic environment allows us to avoid
complexities such as the determination of the optimal maturity structure of bonds, or the in-
corporation of expectations asymmetries in a dynamic game between the domestic economy
and external creditors.18
4.1 A trap of high international sovereign interest rates
Throughout this section we assume that the underlying model is this of optimal-￿scal policy,
presented in Section 2. In other words, we abstract from rent-seeking groups in our main
discussion of traps and bailouts and we return to this extension in a later section which
examines bailouts under corruption. We focus on a scenario in which a country, perhaps
after a disaster in its immediately recent past, ￿nds itself with a high outstanding external-
sovereign-debt-GDP ratio in period 0. If such a debt-GDP ratio, b0, is higher than a certain
threshold, ￿, then we assume that external creditors (asymmetrically) think of this country
as being constrained.19 In particular, external creditors think that, even if interest rates
17For a formal theory of expectations about disaster risk and rational learning about the likelihood of rare
disasters, see, for example, Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011).
18A study presenting an analytically solved example that demonstrates the complexity of dynamic games
under imperfect information is Koulovatianos (2010).
19Policy makers and analysts continue to use simple rules of thumb to judge risks and to assess ￿scal
sustainability (see Mody and Saravia, 2003). Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2010) and Manasse and Roubini (2008)
have identi￿ed explicit external debt to GDP thresholds using empirical data for emerging economies that are
associated with default. More speci￿cally, using a novel methodology, Manasse and Roubini (2009) identify
several important indicators that predict future sovereign defaults. Most notably their analysis identi￿es
external debt to GDP ratio (exceeding 50%) as one of the most important predictors of the majority of
sovereign defaults episodes in their sample.
24from period 1 onwards are rss, there is high disutility due to the discrepancy between taxes
and spending (￿t ￿ gt = rssbt = rssb1 for all t 2 f1;2;:::g, and both private and public
consumption are low). External creditors believe that this disutility creates social pressure
for partial default, i.e., a haircut of magnitude b0￿￿, so as to return to the socially bearable
debt-GDP ratio, ￿.20 So, conditional on any anticipated stream of interest rates from period
1 and on, frtg
1




1 = ￿ (1 + r0)￿0B
￿
0 , (54)





1 ￿ (b0 ￿ ￿ ￿)
1




1 denotes external-creditor demand that incorporates the anticipation of a haircut,
and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. 21
Domestic supply for bonds is still given by equation (20), i.e., B1 = ￿ (1 + r0)B0 +
(1 ￿ ￿)W1 ￿ L. Even if the domestic government does not intend to make a haircut of
magnitude 1 ￿ ￿0, the interest rate in period 0 must increase. If the previously anticipated
interest rate was r0 = rss, the price of 1-period zero-coupon bonds, P ss, must change accord-
ing to ^ P=P ss = ￿0, in which ^ P is the price that incorporates the anticipation of a haircut,
while P ss does not incorporate such an expectation and corresponds to intrinsic bond return
equal to rss. With P ss = 1=(1 + rss), and ^ P = 1=(1 + ^ r0), the new gross-e⁄ective interest
20Note that equation (16) implies lower public good provision with increases in the debt to GDP ratio.
21We also assume that b0 ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1. The reason why ￿ ￿ may be higher than ￿ is that external creditors may
still require a premium for some period after a partial default. Alternatively, if ￿ ￿ = ￿, external creditors
may continue to buy bonds. This is a simpli￿cation. One may think of such an assumption in two ways:
(a) the default risk premium is proportional to the haircut although in principle it can be higher to the
point where the bond price is substantially lower, or (b) the country will honor future debt obligations in
the future despite defaulting today. Our key goal here is to demonstrate the sovereign trap, and we leave
the explicit pricing of bonds to models with uncertainty and information asymmetries.
25rate is,




If the domestic government starts with b0 > ￿, and (erroneously) anticipates that frt = rssg
1
t=1,
then equation (21) implies that W1 = L=(1 ￿ ￿).22 In turn, equation (20) implies that
B1 = ￿ (1 + ^ r0)B0. So, b1 = ￿ (1 + ^ r0)b0=(1 + ￿), and after this equation is combined with




b0 > b0 > ￿ . (57)
Under this scenario, equation (57) shows that the domestic government intensi￿es its problem
in period 1, and the interest rate in period 1, ^ r1 is expected to rise to a higher level than
^ r0, since external creditors anticipate an even bigger haircut of size b1 ￿ ￿ ￿ > b0 ￿ ￿ ￿. This
is a simple demonstration of a trap of high international sovereign interest rates which may,
indeed, force the domestic government to default within a short period of time.23
Countries participating in a monetary union such as the Euro zone have the special
feature that they cannot smooth out the e⁄ects of such a trap through loose monetary policy.
For countries outside a monetary union, one traditional way of achieving this monetary
smoothing is through the domestic government selling bonds to domestic commercial banks
22Such an error may be due to an asymmetry in disaster-risk expectations between the domestic govern-
ment and external creditors. One example of a study which shows how disaster-risk expectations under
informational imperfections can be formulated in continuous time is Koulovatianos and Wieland (2011).
Concerning the direction of change of interest rates, in a deterministic environment the term structure is
￿ at, so abitrage would lead to this new intrinsic annual return, ^ r0, for bonds of any maturity. In a model
with uncertainty and imperfect information the term structure need not be ￿ at, but the interest-rate burden
should change towards the same direction for bonds of all maturities. For the purposes of our analysis here,
we can rationalize the outcome of ^ r0 through an implicit assumption that there is a momentum of having
di⁄erent expectations between external creditors and the domestic economy. An example of an early study
that models informational asymmetries between governments and external creditors explicitly is this of Cole
et al. (1995).
23Cole and Kehoe (2000) formally illustrate how self-fulling default expectations can lead to sovereign debt
crises. The crisis ensues when creditors loose con￿dence in the government￿ s ability to roll over debt. In
their model, market beliefs can trigger a default when a country￿ s fundamentals such as the level, maturity
structure of government debt and capital stock are within a crisis zone. One of the important insights
generated by their model is the role played by the maturity structure of debt, with longer maturities shrinking
the region of self-ful￿lling defaults.
26which are partly owned by the state. A high supply of bonds that carry high default risk to
the domestic banking system obliges the domestic central bank to buy these bonds through
the issuing of more domestic currency to the system, an in￿ ationary policy. Following such
a strategy is not possible for countries within a monetary union, even partially.24 For this
reason, sovereign-debt bailouts arise as natural solutions for such entrapped countries within
a monetary union, in order to avoid risks of bank runs. The following section assesses the
success potential of such plans subject to the level of initial outstanding external sovereign
debt, and subject to bailout-plan duration and to the level of commonly agreed interest
rates.
4.2 Sovereign bailout plans
In case countries enter a high-interest-rate trap as described in the previous section, sovereign
bailout plans o⁄er ￿nancing with controlled interest rates over a certain period of time. The
goal of a bailout plan is to assist a country to reach a certain sovereign debt-GDP ratio, say,
below a threshold level ￿, which allows the country to return to free international capital
markets in order to borrow.25 Since sovereign states are independent democracies, policy
setting is endogenous. Policy endogeneity is the most demanding aspect of evaluating the
success prospects of bailout plans. Our model ￿lls this gap and can serve as a simple vehicle
in order to carry out an analysis of the success prospects of a bailout plan.26
24Even for a country outside a monetary union with high outstanding external sovereign debt, such a strategy
of selling bonds to its domestic state-owned commercial banks has its limits. This strategy leads to high
in￿ ation, which can cause the domestic currency to depreciate. Domestic currency depreciation would
increase the monetary value of external debt in foreign currencies which become more and more expensive.
25We assume that, due to the risk of banking-risk contagion within a monetary union, bailout plans do not
allow for sovereign-debt haircuts. So, we focus on bailout plans in the form of the rescue package for Greece
in May 2010.
26Our model abstracts from the endogeneity of growth rates, and especially from the connection between tax
burdens and growth prospects. This connection, in turn, can a⁄ect default risk, and the success prospects of
a bailout plan. These elements may not be the most crucial in evaluating the success potential of bailouts.
Nevertheless, the explicit modeling of growth rates and default risk are useful extensions for future work.
27Let the duration of a bailout plan be T years with a ￿xed and controlled interest rate,
rb. In such a setting, starting from period 0, the bailout plan is e⁄ective until period T ￿1,
and its goal is to achieve
bT ￿ ￿ , (58)
which can allow the country to return to free capital markets from period T and on. So,
the bailout plan must specify parameters T and rb.27 In Appendix C we show that for all
bailout periods, t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g, the law of motion for the debt-GDP ratio is












￿ (1 + rb)
1 + ￿
.
Equation (59) implies that, for each t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g, the intersection of the line implied











Given equation (60), a distinction is crucial: whether rb is greater than rss or not. If
rb > rss, then the bailout plan must secure that bt < ￿ bt for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g in order to
guarantee that the domestic government￿ s optimal debt-GDP ratio, bt, decreases over time.
A geometric analysis demonstrates that, in case rb > rss, the requirement for a decreasing
optimal debt-GDP ratio over time is having
bt < ￿ bt , (61)
for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g, since allowing bt > ￿ bt for some ￿ t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g will lead to an
increasing debt-GDP ratio after that (b^ t+1 > b^ t for all ^ t ￿ ￿ t).
27In practice, the IMF-EU plan for Euro-zone countries speci￿es a more explicit plan of monitoring the
progress of policy-making in the bailed-out country. Yet, each democratic country is free to opt out from
the plan, which makes the analysis of optimal policy the most crucial constraint captured by our model.
28On the contrary, providing a low interest rate, ￿ < rb < rss, will always lead to eventual
success, as long as bailout duration, T, is not too long to generate incentives for issuing more
debt, due to the low cost of sovereign borrowing. In Appendix A we demonstrate that the





















for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g, which is the solution of equation (59). To see that a bailout plan




























If T is too high, then the factor multiplying ￿t in the last term of equation (63) may be
negative, and since ￿ < 1 when ￿ < rb < rss, bt may start increasing after some time.
Nevertheless, if the design of a bailout plan avoids this possibility, then low interest rates
with ￿ < rb < rss typically lead to a faster transition of bt to a level below ￿, compared to
the case of rb > rss.
As we have demonstrated in Section 2, if the bailout plan meets the goal of bT ￿ ￿, then,
from period T and on, the country returns to international capital markets with interest rate
rss, and bt = bT ￿ ￿ for all t ￿ T. Proposition 1 describes the features of successful bailout
plans.
Proposition 3 Given an initial sovereign-debt-GDP ratio b0 > ￿, a bailout
plan characterized by a combination (rb;T) with rb > ￿, is successful if T is the
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Proof See Appendix C. ￿
Proposition 3 shows that in the process of designing a bailout plan, the choice of (rb;T)
with rb > rss needs to take into account particular constraints. The most important con-
straint we have emphasized through our model is the political feasibility of a bailout plan.
Since EU-type monetary-union countries are democracies, optimality of domestic policy is
a key concern. In the following section we study bailout plans in the presence of political
pathologies such as corruption through rent-seeking groups.
4.3 Corruption and bailouts in the Euro zone
It seems that corruption in the south-periphery Euro-zone countries is a major concern of
the public and also of country analysts. A glance at the ￿IMF country reports￿Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (2011a,b,d) for Greece, Italy, and Portugal, make explicit reference
to the need for reducing rent-seeking activities in the ￿rst three countries, while the coun-
try report for Ireland (International Monetary Fund (2011c)) focuses on Ireland￿ s banking
problems. Corruption indicators constructed from various institutions (World Bank, OECD
and the Transparency International Organization) uniformly rank the corruption level in
these countries highest among all Euro area countries. For example, in Arghyrou (2010),
the three-year average (2007, 2008 and 2009) of the perception corruption index from Trans-
parency International ranks Italy as 45th and Greece as 50th in a sample of 115 countries
(with lower ranking equivalent to higher corruption), surprisingly even lower than many
developing countries with weak political and social institutions. Spain and Portugal rank
30closely behind.28
In our model interest rates are the cornerstone of diagnosing sovereign-debt pathologies.
So, in Figure 2, for a period before the introduction of the Euro, and up to recently, we
plot the 10-year-maturity yield in the countries of the south periphery of the Eurozone, in
Ireland, and we also use Germany as a yardstick.29 Ireland has the lowest corruption index,
and its yield in the 1990s is close to that of Germany. The problems of Ireland start after
the fall of 2008, with its spreads following the same path as Portuguese spreads in the post-
credit-crunch era. Table 1 shows that Ireland never exhibited high corruption, even back
in year 1995. But Ireland￿ s sovereign debt is exploding due to its problems in the banking
sector.30 According to our model, Ireland falls in the theoretical category of our analysis in
which rent-seeking groups are not a burden, but its trapped due to its debt burden. Based
on our analysis above, Ireland￿ s bailout plan seems most likely to succeed. For Greece and
Portugal, we refer to the sections specializing in bailouts and corruption.
4.3.1 One big ￿mob￿and bailouts
After substituting (49) into the value function of a non-rent seeker, the distortion caused
by the resources spent by the rent-seeking group (driven by the presence of parameter ￿R
in (49)) leads to lower welfare of non-rent seekers. On the contrary, rent-seeking households
28All three indices of corruption correlate very strongly with each other and aim at measuring the overall
extent of corruption in the public sector (e.g. bribes, kickbacks, public funds appropriation, etc.). It is
also worth noting that credit ratings agencies (e.g. Standard and Poor￿ s), which have also played a role in
the development of the EU sovereign crisis by in￿ uencing creditors default expectations, take into account
corruption as a factor in the political dimension that determines sovereign ratings and consequently a⁄ect
country speci￿c interest rates.
29The 10-year-maturity yields in Figure 1 are nominal. For the pre-Euro period in the 1990s, even if we had
controlled for in￿ ation expectations, (a) the picture would have been similar, and (b) in that case we would
have lost the in￿ ation premium, which still re￿ ects a credibility concern. One reason for that credibiity
concern is corruption, but other concerns must be at play as well (such as growth prospects of particular
economies, etc.).
30In International Monetary Fund (2011c, p. 21), it is mentioned: ￿Debt (in Ireland) is projected to peak
at 120 percent of GDP in 2013, and to then decline gradually.￿
31have higher well being compared to non-rent seekers, due to the additional consumption of
the rent. In the case that a country￿ s outstanding external debt is high enough to make
external creditors concerned about a haircut in the fashion described by equation (55), then
a bailout plan as discussed in Section 3 may be implemented. In this case of one big ￿mob￿
(N = 1), a bailout-plan analysis is the same as in Section 3. However, it may be that social
dissatisfaction of non rent seekers may justify setting the threshold ￿ of (55) to lower levels
compared to this of the benchmark model.
In International Monetary Fund (2011b, p. 28, footnote 5), it is mentioned: ￿Italy ranks
67th on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2010, among the lowest
in the EU. The Council of Europe￿ s Group of States against Corruption in its last evalua-
tion of Italy (2008) noted that "...corruption in public administration is widely di⁄used" and
recognized the "connections (that) exist between corruption and organized crime." ￿Accord-
ing to our analysis, if Italy enters a bailout plan, the possibility that its rent-seeking groups
play a cooperative strategy may give to Italy an advantage. For Portugal, in International
Monetary Fund (2011d, p. 66), among the stated objectives is mentioned: ￿Ensure a level
playing ￿eld and minimize rent-seeking behavior by strengthening competition and sectoral
regulators; eliminate special rights of the state in private companies (golden shares); [...].￿
Perhaps, at a ￿rst stage, the request by the European Commission for consensus among
political parties in Portugal aims at placing Portugal in the category of one rent-seeking
group in order to avoid the commons problem explained above.
324.3.2 More than one rent-seeking groups and bailouts
In Section 3 we have shown that when rent-seeking groups are more than one, the debt-
GDP ratio always increases over time.31 As a result, any bailout plan would never lead to
a desired debt-GDP ratio target asymptotically, unless the bailout plan controlled interest
rates forever. In light of this observation, the main target of a bailout plan should be this
of eliminating rent-seeking groups in the corrupt economy.
In the case of corruption with N ￿ 2, the problem of a bailed-out country is structural. If,
for example, rent-seeking groups are tied to a strong bipartisan system, then the monetary
union should aim at receiving guarantees of transparency by the two dominant political
parties of a bailed-out country. The requirement of transparency towards the rest of the
lenders of the monetary union may eliminate rent-seeking groups. This requirement should
complement any other features of the bailout plan (such as the tuple (rb;T) discussed in
Proposition 3).
In Figure 2, the nominal yield for Greece was very close to its German counterpart
between years 2001-2008. Perhaps, during that period, external creditors had formed the
belief that Greek rent-seeking groups would decrease their ￿scal stealing due to Euro-zone
monitoring. Yet, post-credit crunch facts revealed that Greece￿ s ￿scal voracity problem
remains to date. The persistent failure of political parties in Greece to cooperate and the
increased polarization of its bipartisan system makes the goal of ￿ghting corruption in Greece
a top priority.
31In particular we have shown that bt ! 1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)], i.e. bt asymptotically converges to exhausting
the domestic economy￿ s total wealth-to-GDP ratio, with the latter being evaluated at the asymptotic level
of interest rates, rss.
335. Conclusion
The recent sovereign-debt crisis in the Euro zone has led to a vivid political debate con-
cerning the future e⁄ectiveness of implemented sovereign bailout plans. A key aspect to be
understood in this debate is the determinants of policy setting in bailed-out governments.
Any EU country which may be candidate for entering the EU sovereign bailout plan is an
independent democracy which has full responsibility (and almost full discretion) for setting
its own ￿scal policy. So, bailout-plan e⁄ectiveness involves a political-economy analysis.
In our analysis of endogenous policy setting we have emphasized the role of international-
market interest rates. We have studied forward-looking optimal policy which takes into
account that debt-GDP ratios should not be raised too much due to the high future cost
of debt servicing. Yet, as we have demonstrated, there is a threshold level of interest rates
above which a government will still optimally increase its external-sovereign-debt-GDP-ratio
over time. It is this interest-rate impact on optimal policy that can lead countries with high
outstanding external-sovereign-debt-GDP-ratio to a trap. If external creditors anticipate
sovereign default, then they lend at high interest rates. These high interest rates can, in
turn, lead to a self-ful￿lling default outcome as for example in Cole and Kehoe (2000).
EU-type sovereign bailout plans aim at aiding countries into such traps to return to
free capital markets, mainly through putting them on a track of reducing their outstanding
debt-GDP-ratio. The key to such a quick recovery is having a bailout plan with low interest
rates. Yet, if bailed-out countries su⁄er from corruption in the form of rent-seeking groups
stealing public resources, then a bailout plan may be hopeless unless rent-seeking groups
are eliminated. The reason is, rent-seeking groups lead to a collective impatience for public
goods and rents, which leads to oversupply of bonds. International markets that anticipate
such an oversupply of bonds in the future, demand high interest rates, which, in turn, lead
34to an explosive debt-GDP ratio over time. Our analysis of rent-seeking groups may also
explain some resistance from the side of the broader public to debt austerity plans. Even
non-rent seekers support a policy of excessive sovereign-debt-GDP ratios, as a response to
the fact that rent seekers expropriate public resources. In brief, if bailed-out countries su⁄er
from corruption, then the goal of the bailout plan should be this of eliminating rent-seeking
groups.
We believe that our model provides a useful starting point for several extensions to models
with endogenous international interest rates. A ￿rst natural extension is taxation that does
not only distort welfare (as is the case in our model), but also GDP-level or GDP-growth
performance. Another natural extension is the inclusion of uncertainty, informational imper-
fections or asymmetries, and explicit credibility concerns. Finally, a deeper understanding
of bailout plans would consider the political economy of voters and governments of other
monetary-union countries which ￿nance bailouts. Such analyses can shed light on structural
reasons behind imbalances or misalignment of ￿scal policies within the EU, and point at
ways of solving such problems.
356. Appendix A
Optimal policy-setting in the benchmark model
First-order conditions @V=@￿t = 0 and @V=@Bt+1 = 0, imply equation (9) and also,
Gt+1
Gt
= ￿(1 + rt+1) , (66)
and
Gt = Bt+1 ￿ (1 + rt)Bt + ￿tYt . (67)
Combining equations (9) and (67) leads to,
Bt+1 ￿ (1 + rt)Bt = [￿G ￿ (1 + ￿G)￿t]Yt . (68)
Moreover, solving (66) forward gives Gt = ￿
t￿t
j=1 (1 + rj)￿G0, which can be combined with
(9) to obtain,








(1 + rj) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿0) . (69)
Equation (68) together with (69) and (7) yield the recursion,




(1 + rj) ￿ (1 + ￿)
t L , for all t ￿ 1 , (70)
together with (10). Solving equation (70) forward, leads to equation (11).
7. Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
We take a guess on the functional form of strategies,
C
i;R (Bt;zt j frsg
1







for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng , (71)
36in which f￿ig
N
i=1 is a set of undetermined coe¢ cients. The Lagrangian of group j￿ s problem,
































First-order conditions lead to,





























(1 + rt+1) , (74)
due to the symmetry of the problem, which allows us to consider that ￿i = ￿R for all
i 2 f1;:::;Ng. Combining (72) and (73), and substituting them into (34) we obtain,
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt +
1 +
￿H z }| {
￿G + N￿R
￿G
Gt ￿ Yt . (75)
Using equations (72) through (75), the rest of the analysis follows this in Section 2, in which,
after imposing the transversality condition limt!1 Bt=
Qt￿1




(1 ￿ ￿N)[ztWt+1 ￿ (1 + rt)Bt] . (76)






(1 ￿ ￿N)[ztWt+1 ￿ (1 + rt)Bt] . (77)




(1 ￿ ￿N) ,
and since ￿N = ￿ [1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)￿R], we can prove (44) and (46). Proving (45) and (47) follows
from direct substitution, completing the proof of the proposition. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
Equating demand for bonds (equation (19)) and supply of bonds (equation (45)) leads
to,










Substituting (78) into (45) leads to equation (50).












After considering equation (78) one period ahead and substituting (79) into it, we combine
the result with (78) referring to period t, and, after some algebra, the result is
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿N)
Wt+1
L




= 1 . (80)




= 1 + (￿ ￿ ￿N)(1 + rt)bt , (81)
and after substituting (81) into (80) we arrive at
[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿N)(1 + rt)bt + ￿N]
1 + rt+1
1 + ￿
= 1 . (82)
38Combining (82) with (50) proves (53).
For proving the dynamics given by (51), equation (82) implies that
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿N)(1 + rt)bt + ￿N < ￿ ,
￿ (1 + rt+1)
1 + ￿





(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rt)
, rt+1 > r
ss for all t 2 f0;1;:::g . (83)
Optimization requires that Gt > 0 for all t 2 f0;1;:::g, and so equation (48) implies
Gt > 0 ,
Wt+1
L
> (1 + rt)bt , for all t 2 f0;1;:::g . (84)
Combining (81) with (84) leads to
Gt > 0 , bt <
1
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rt)
for all t 2 f0;1;:::g , (85)
and given (83) proves that rt+1 > rss for all t 2 f0;1;:::g in (51).
Combining (53) and (50) directly and using the recursion
1 ￿ ￿
￿















































since (53) holds for t 2 f1;2;:::g. since 1=b1￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ in (86) is equivalent to b1 <
1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)], (85) implies that b1 < 1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)] holds as well. In addition,
since for N ￿ 2 equation (46) implies that ￿N < ￿, after taking the limit t ! 1, equation
(86) proves that bt ! 1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)] in (52), and substituting 1=[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rss)] for
39bt in (53) proves that rt ! rss. Finally, for all b0, there exists an r0 such that, according to
(53),







proving the proposition. ￿
8. Appendix C
To calculate the law of motion given by (59), notice that, under a proposed bailout plan


















Combining (87) with (20) leads to (59), which is the generalized version for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g.
For the solution of (59) given by (62), express (59) as,
bt+1 = ￿bt + ￿ ￿ ￿!
t , (88)
in which ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(rb ￿ ￿), ￿ ￿ [(1 + ￿)=(1 + rb)]
T, and ! ￿ (1 + rb)=(1 + ￿). Solving













which is equivalent to (62).
Proof of Proposition 3
Inequality (64) re￿ ects the condition bT ￿ ￿ and it is derived directly from (62) after
setting t = T. Regarding inequality (65), in the case of rb > rss, we need to guarantee that
40bt < ￿ bt, for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g, as required by (61) for stability. Fix any t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 2g











In order to meet the requirement bt+1 < ￿ bt+1, combine (59) with (89) to obtain, after some
algebra,





￿ (1 + rb)
,
































Inequality (91) must hold for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g. Since 1=￿ < 1=￿
T, substituting t = T ￿1
into (91) guarantees that (91) holds for all t 2 f0;:::;T ￿ 1g, and doing so leads to inequality
(65). ￿
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Figure 1  Source: European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund. 
 




























Figure 2 -- Source: ECB, Secondary market yields of government bonds with maturities of 
close to 10 years, Ranking according to the Corruption Perception Index 2010 from 


























































































































































































































































































and corruption ranking  according to Corruption Perception Index 2010Table 1 -- Corruption Perception Index 
Country 
1995  1998  2003  2005  2008  2010 
Score ( Ranking ) 
Ireland  8.57 (10)  8.2 (14)  7.5 (18)  7.4 (19)  7.7 (16)  8.0 (14) 
Germany  8.14 (11)  7.9 (15)  7.7 (16)  8.2 (16)  7.9 (14)  7.9 (15) 
Spain  4.35 (24)  6.1 (23)  6.9 (23)  7.0 (23)  6.5(28)  6.1 (30) 
Portugal  5.56 (20)  6.5(22)  6.6 (25)  6.5 (26)  6.1 (32)  6.0 (32) 
Italy  2.99 (31)  4.6 (39)  5.3 (35)  5.0 (40)  4.8 (55)  3.9 (67) 
Greece  4.04 (28)  4.9 (36)  4.3 (50)  4.3 (47)  4.7 (57)  3.5 (68) 
Best‐worst score  9.55‐1.94  10‐1.4  9.7‐1.3  9.7‐1.7  9.3‐1.0  9.3‐1.1 
 
Source: Transparency International 
Note: Higher score means lower corruption and numbers appearing in 
parentheses next to each score is the country’s world corruption 
ranking based on the score in each particular year.  
 
 